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BACKGROUND: The scarcity of blood is and has been a global problem. Efforts to increase 
the supply of blood have become a priority issue for every nation, so that the rising demands 
for blood are sustained. The most commonly used method of blood donation worldwide is 
voluntary (unpaid) donations, however, in order to increase the supply the use of financial 
incentives has been suggested    
OBJECTIVE:  To investigate to what degree people believe that higher payments for giving 
blood will lead to more people donate blood, and to determine what socio-demographic 
factors that affects such beliefs (gender, age, education and income) 
METHOD: Cross sectional data collected from the 20 counties of Norway on beliefs and 
socio-demographic factors such as gender, age, income and education level is used. Pearson 
Chi-Square tests and Multinomial Logistic regression analysis are used to investigate the 
research questions. 
RESULT: We found that a majority of the sample believed that paying for blood will lead 
more people to donate. Furthermore, age was found to play a significant role in explaining the 
beliefs about the effect from using blood donation payments. Younger age groups believe 
more than older age groups that paying for blood will increase the recruitment of blood 
donors. There are some indications that women, less than men, believe in that paying for 
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1. Introduction  
For millions of people worldwide whose lives depend on blood transfusion, blood is not fully 
available and can be unsafe (Fayoumi, 2011). Over 1 million blood units are annually 
collected on global basis, however, more units of blood are needed to cope with the increasing 
global demand for blood (Buciuniene et al., 2006). The increase in the demand is caused by 
population growth, a higher life expectancy, urbanization and an increase in accident rates 
(Shahshahani et al., 2006).  Although blood donations also are increasing, it is likely that the 
current rates will not sustain the future demand for blood (Shahshahani et al., 2006).  
The use of voluntary blood donation is the most common method, but it is believed that this 
alone cannot meet the increasing demand for blood. In the debate on how to increase the 
future supply of blood, the use of financial compensations has been proposed. However, there 
are potential problems associated with such a method since the risk of contracting infectious 
diseases could increase and since many researchers believe that compensating blood donors 
financially, in fact, may decrease rather than increase the total supply of blood due to the 
potential presence of crowding-out effects. Most of the literature on blood donations focuses 
on the identification of factors that affect blood donation rates. Important results from these 
studies are that factors such as income, education, gender and age all predicts the probability 
of being a blood donor. 
In this paper, we are concerned with the beliefs about the effectiveness of blood donating 
incentives behavior in the general population. The research questions are as follows;  
(i) Do people believe that higher payments for giving blood will lead to more people to 
donate blood?  
(ii) What factors may explain peoples’ beliefs? 
In answering the above questions I have applied data from a survey carried out in the months 
of February and March 2007 that includes 743 adults Norwegians (between 17-80 years). As 
concerning the first research question, we know, for the time being, that in Norway blood 
supply depends on a primarily voluntary donation system. As for the second research 
question, the focus will be on factors that from the research literature have showed to play a 




Section 1 introduces the paper. Section 2 acts as a background for this study. This section 
describes how the collection of blood is organized across the world as well as referring to 
some of the literature on blood donation behavior. Section 3 discusses some of the theoretical 
literature discussing the incentives for blood donation with a focus on possible crowding-out 
effects. Section 4 presents data and the statistical methods applied in this study, while section 
5 present the main findings. Section 6 is a discussion of the results, while section 7 concludes. 
2. Background 
2.1. Demand Versus Supply  
The primary aim of blood services is to meet the demand for blood and blood components. 
This is often done via voluntary blood donations combined with an effective inventory 
management and the appropriate use of blood and its alternatives (Contreras, 2009). 
 
Figure 1: The blood supply chain (Contreras, 2009) 
Contreras (2009), Presents the “blood supply chain” that consists of the four following types 
of agents: (i) donors, (ii), the blood service, (iii), hospitals, and (iv), the recipients of blood 
(see table 1). The main responsibility of the blood service is to keep production losses as low 
as possible by use of good inventory management methods in conjunction with hospital 
laboratories while clinicians are responsible for prescribing blood only when there are no 
other options available. According to Contreras (2009), the demand for blood is not easy to 
predict due to factors such population demographics and technological changes. The demand 
for blood is for example reduced due to improved surgical and anesthetic techniques. 
Examples here are the treatment of correctable anaemias in pre-assessment clinics, the use of 
antifibrinolytic agents and intra-and postoperative cell salvage. In addition, investments into 
3 
 
artificial blood could also increase the total blood supply.    
Blood transfusions are carried out globally, but their availability as well as quality varies 
significantly across regions and countries. Worldwide, approximately, 75-90 millions blood 
units are collected annually (McCullough, 2012). The World Health Organization (WHO) 
predicts that 1% of the population should be blood donors in order to cope with a country’s 
basic requirement for blood. The minimum requirements are somewhat higher for countries 
with advanced health care facilities (WHO, 2010). 
 
The average blood donation rate is 15 times higher in developed nations compared with 
developing ones. More than 70 countries have a blood donation rate below 1% (WHO, 2010). 
The annual blood requirement rate in Africa is about 8 million units on the same time as the 
actual rate is only 3.2 million units (41.5%). In South East Asia, 7 million units of blood are 
collected annually while 15 million units are the minimum requirement. Globally more than 
81 million blood units are annually collected but only 45% of these are donated in very 
populated countries (WHO, 2010). 
 
 In recent years, three problems have emerged that increases the risk of inadequate blood 
supply. First, technological innovations in surgery and oncological therapies have resulted in 
more aggressive medical treatments. Second, “there is a general tightening of donation 
eligibility criteria such as stepped-up travel restrictions and restrictions due to the Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease” (Goette and Stutzer,2008 p,1). Third, there is a seasonal shortage due to 
seasonal variations both in the demand and supply of blood (Goette and Stutzer, 2008). 
2.2. Types of Blood Donations and Collections Schemes  
The structure and blood collection schemes differ from country to country. Currently, three 
main types of blood collection schemes are used in Europe. In countries like Britain, France 
and Ireland, the National Health Service is solely responsible for the collection of blood. In 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, the Red Cross has major responsibility 
with some additional supply from some small blood banks. In Italy, Spain, Denmark, and 
Portugal, both large voluntary organizations and blood banks administer the collection of 




The international export of blood from third world countries prompted the WHO to suggest 
that national blood services only should carry out voluntary (un-paid) blood donations so that 
blood safety is ensured (Jones et al., 2003). Furthermore, the European Union Blood Directive 
of 2005 included a paragraph that promotes unpaid blood donations. However, it is not always 
clear what constitutes an unpaid donor since definitions may differ across countries. For 
instance in Denmark, donors are not financially compensated even for time costs and travel 
expenses (Vox Sanguinis., 2006). In some countries only bone marrow and stem cell donors 
are being compensated for time costs, travel expenses and accommodation costs. In other 
countries again time costs and travel expenses are being compensated for all types of 
donations. In Switzerland, financial compensations are not used, however, blood donors are 
given a gift for every 25th donation representing a maximum value of $100 after 150 
donations (Vox Sanguinis., 2006 p, 63).    
2.2.1.  Voluntary (Unpaid) Blood Donations  
Smith (1981 p, 23), Defines “volunteer as individual engaging in behavior that is not bio-
socially determined (e.g., drinking, sleeping), nor economically necessitated, (e.g., paid job, 
house work) nor socio-politically compelled (e.g., paying ones taxes, clothing oneself before 
appearing in public), but rather that is essentially (primarily) motivated by the expectation of 
psychic benefits of some kind as the result of activities that have market value greater than 
any remuneration received for such activities”. In this aspect defining voluntary does not 
focus on relationship between altruism, unlike many other definitions of volunteerism (Smith, 
1981). 
 
Olson (1965), states that individuals can be expected to act consistently with the interest of 
the group to which they belong. In the absence of incentives, wealth-maximizing individuals 
are not likely to contribute to activities that will benefit all individuals, and rather choose to 
“free ride” on the contributions of others. However, many human beings also engage in acts 
being costly to themselves in order to help others in need. They vote, donate fund to political 
organizations, donate blood, and participate in rescue squads (Tirole and Benabou, 2005). 
A survey done by Alessandrini (2007), reviews research on the social factors behind donating 
blood voluntary. A main finding is that altruism is the most important social factor.  
Figure 2 below shows the distribution of voluntary (unpaid) blood donations in different 
regions of the world. It is observed that voluntarily (unpaid blood donation) blood donations 




Figure 2: The distribution of voluntary blood donations 
Source: WHO (2011) 
2.2.2. Family and Replacement Donations  
Family and replacement donations is a blood donation mechanism where a family member 
donates blood to his next of kin or to his/her community whenever a need arises (WHO, 
2010). In some situations, a patient in need of transfusion must recruit a given number of 
replacement donors before getting access to donated blood. Even if the blood donors are not 
officially being given any financial compensations, it is likely that “hidden” payment are used 
(WHO, 2010). Some patients prefer blood donations from close family members or from 
friends, believing that such donations reduce the risk of contracting infectious diseases, 
however, infection rates are in fact highest for family and replacement donations (WHO, 
2010). 
2.2.3. Paid Blood Donations  
Paid donations are used by blood donations that are given in exchange for a fixed fee 
(financial compensations). Paid blood donors are often regular donors that contracts with 
blood banks (WHO, 2010). In some cases, such blood donors may give blood to more than 




2.4. The Risks of Blood Infectious Diseases  
Following international guidelines, all blood banks worldwide are obliged to carry out a set of 
procedures that keeps the blood supply free from infections (Goncalez et al., 2010). These 
procedures are carried out irrespective of being paid donations or voluntary donations. For 
developed countries, no study confirms a relationship between paid blood donations and the 
risk of infection. However, the risk increases with an increasing number of first-time donors 
(Jones et al., 2003). 
The diseases that are seen as transfusion-transmissible infections (TTI) are Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Syphilis, Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C and Human T-lymph 
Trophic Viruses (Goncalez et al., 2010). In the case of HIV, screening for antibodies leaves an 
immunologic window period (i.e., the delay between a newly acquired HIV infection and the 
development of sufficient levels of antibodies for detection) (Goncalez et al., 2010 p, 1806). 
More than13 millions units of the 75-90 millions blood units being collected each year are not 
tested for HIV, Hepatitis C Virus, Hepatitis B Virus or Syphilis due to a lack of well trained 
staff, poor quality of test kits or due to infrastructural break downs (McCullough, 2012). At 
present, risk factors in various donors groups are debated. There is a concern that the use of 
financial incentives may attract infected donors that hide their health status to get paid 
(Politis, 2000). Results from clinical studies show that blood components from private blood 
banks are vested with the highest risk of hepatitis B (Politis, 2000). Paid blood donors tend to 
come from lower socio-economic classes where the use of alcohol and drugs are more 
common. 
2.5.  Literature on Blood Donating Behavior  
2.5.1. Effects from Demographic and Socio-demographic Factors  
Research done for the last 20 years tries to explain individual donor behavior by demographic 
variables and motivations. Most of the blood donors comes from a small dedicated group that 
differs from the general population. Factors that are associated with a person giving blood are, 
marital status, gender, educational level, occupation, peer pressure, apathy, self-esteem, race, 






2.5.2.  The Effect of Gender on Blood Donation Rates  
More females than males are first time blood donors, but with subsequent donations the 
percentage shifts to a male preponderance of 60-80%. In average, males represent 52% of the 
blood donors and females 48% (McCullough, 2012). The gender disparity is not as wide as it 
used to be. Women donate less blood than men on medical grounds. In average females 
weight less than men and females risk anemia when being pregnant (Healy, 2000). Data from 
more than 100 countries find that 30% of the donors are women (WHO, 2011).  For 25 
countries, the donation rate by women is above 40%, while for 16 of the countries it is less 
than 10% (WHO, 2011).   
In Spain the blood donation rate for females is 46%, in Portugal 43%, in Italy and Greece are 
32% and 33%, respectively,  in Belgium 45.4%.  In Netherland, France Denmark, the rate is 
about 50% while for United Kingdom and Finland the rates are 53% and 55% respectively 
(Bani and Giussani, 2010). “It does not, however, seem that the difference is related to 
territory, since the percentages of female donors in other Mediterranean countries, such as 
Spain and Portugal, differ considerably from that in Italy” (Bani and Giussani, 2010 p, 279). 
In Norway, the blood donation rates are 53% for men and 47% for women (Misje et al., 
2005). 
2.5.3. The Effect of Education on Blood Donation Rates  
 Education seems to be a positive determinant for a broad range of prosocial behaviors like 
blood donation, organ donation and charities (Bekkers  and Graaf, 2006). It is found that 
people with a higher education are more likely to show prosocial behaviors than those with a 
lower education (Bekkers  and Graaf, 2006). Blood donors tend to have a higher education 
than the general population. Donors with a university level of education are the ones with the 
highest blood donation rate. A study carried out in Canada found that more than 60% of the 
blood donors had a post high-school level of education (McCullough, 2012). 
 2.5.4. The Effect of Age and Income on Blood Donation Rates   
Figure 3 below describes how the blood donations vary across age groups and income groups 
for 77 countries. 5 % of the blood donors are below 18 years, 31% are between 18-24 years, 
35% are between 24-44 years, 26% are between 45-65 years, while 3% are above 65 years 
(WHO, 2011). In high-income countries, 27% of the blood donors are under 25 years, 
whereas for low and middle-income countries the same age is 45%. High-income countries, 
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40% of the blood donors are older than 45 years, while for low-and middle-income countries 
of same age, the rate is only 18%. Many studies point to a strong association between income 
and blood donations rates (Todd and Lawson, 1999). 
 
Figure 3: Blood donation from donors of various age group and country income group: 
Source: (WHO, 2011). 
The age-distribution of blood donors changed during the 1970s and the 1980s. 2-3% of the 
blood donors were above 60 years in 1970 while 10% were above the same age in 1990. This 
change in the age of the blood donors is attributed to the change that happened to the ages of 
populations in general (McCullough, 2012). Blood bank professional have also found that the 
blood of donors in older ages are safer than for younger groups and for this reason age limits 
have been waived to attract people of old ages (McCullough, 2012). For Norway, comparing 
the age distribution of blood donors with that of the general population, it is found that the 
youngest age group and the oldest age group (18-25 years and 56-65 years) are under-
represented among blood donors (Misje et al., 2005) 
2.6. The Organization of Blood Donations in Norway 
Figure 4 describes how the Norwegian health care system is organized. Norway has a 
decentralized system with universal coverage. The core aim is to provide equal health services 
to all citizens, irrespective of geographical location, gender, age and income. The 
responsibility of providing primary health services is vested on 431municipalities (Morland et 
al., 2010). Since the hospital reform of 2002, the responsibility of specialist care has been 




Figure 4: Structure and organization of Norwegian health care system: 
Source:  (Morland et al., 2010) 
Each RHA run all the hospitals in each geographical region and are headed by an executive 
board being appointed by the Ministry of Health. The four RHAs owns all hospitals in their 
area and each hospital is a separate entity, in tandem to the restructuring, all directorates, 
institutes and registers in health service have been restructured (Flesland and Seghatchian, 
2005). All blood collection pools in Norway are organized and administered within the 
hospitals. In total there is 58 blood collection centers that are organized together with the 
laboratories for clinical chemistry (Rock et al., 2000). The blood banks are individual 
departments in the hospitals. Blood donation in Norway is considered as being voluntary and 
based upon altruistic motives since there are no financial incentives for giving blood (Misje 
et al., 2005). However, the blood donors are given a small token of gratitude being an 
umbrella, a bag or a cap with the blood bank logo and some money to compensate the 
expensed incurred by travelling to the blood bank centers (Misje et al., 2005). 
In 1949 the blood banks were operated by Rikshospitalet and Drammen Sykehus, and later 
the hospitals in Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger were included, while the blood donors 
were recruited by the Norwegian Red Cross (Misje, 2001). In 1960, The Red Cross operated 
its own blood bank in Oslo, the Red Cross Blood Center. This blood bank sold blood and 




Figure 5: Blood donation in Norway 1933-1983: Estimate: 
Source: (Rjaster and Kronstad 1981:48) 
 
Figure 5 shows the development in the blood donation rates (growth) in Norway from 1933 to 
1983. First, it is observed that the total growth has been explosive. Between between1943 and 
1958, the blood donation have increased 20 times (Misje, 2001). Second, in the same period, 
the relative importance of the Red Cross has declined.  
2.6.1. Laws and Regulations; Blood Donation in Norway  
In January 2003, European Union approved new legislation by issuing stricter particular 
guidelines to all member states (Hervig et al., 2004). Norway is not part of the European 
Union, but is obliged to follow EU directives (Hervig et al., 2004).  From 1990, Norway 
have implemented transfusion guidelines, being prepared by specialists and approved by the 
Surgeon General. The latest version was published in 1997 (Hervig et al., 2004). 
2.6.2. Blood Donors in Norway  
The recruitment of blood donors is challenging in Oslo while in rural areas it is satisfactory 
(Flesland et al., 2001). One interesting feature of the present Norwegian legislation is that 
blood donors are termed as “patients” ” (Flesland et al., 2001). “This is counterintuitive to 
most people working within the transfusion service and to the blood donors (Flesland and 
Seghatchian, 2005 p, 8). The Norwegian society used to be a very homogenous society, but in 
the last thirty years the influxes of foreigners from far countries have changed this (Hervig et 
al., 2004). In the 1997 guidelines for transfusion, people from other ethnical groups were not 
allowed to donate blood. This again created political outcry and there was a call for a more 
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liberal policy (Hervig et al., 2004). 
In 2001 institute of Public Health established committee of experts to undertake policy 
changes towards the practices. The committee suggested the change of prevailing exclusion 
criteria for blood donors, implying that most foreigners and their sexual partners were now 
allowed to donate blood after a period of six months starting at the time they arrived Norway 
(Hervig et al., 2004).  
2.6.3. Quality of the Blood  
Various blood banks work relentlessly to prevent the transmission of infectious diseases 
through blood transfusions. Before blood donations are carried out, donors fill out self-
administered questionnaires and are thereafter interviewed by health care personnel (Stigum 
et al., 2001) The questionnaires are issued by the Norwegian Board of Health(NBH) and are 
designed to assess the individual risk of infectious diseases (Stigum et al., 2001).The Good 
Manufacturing Practice (GMP) guidelines published in 1995 resulted in an improvement in 
the quality of the Norwegian transfusion services (Flesland and Seghatchian, 2005). Since 
then, accreditation bodies have accredited some blood banks according to specific standards. 
In addition, to reduce the risk, blood banks are inspected more regularly than any other 
department in a hospital. Currently, the transfusion medicine is regarded as safe, since the 
virus transmission has been adequately dealt with (Flesland and Seghatchian, 2006). 
3.0. Theory on Incentives and Blood Donating Behavior  
Various authors have discussed the role of incentives in connection with blood donation. In 
this section some of these literatures are to be commented upon.      
The question of how to recruit more blood donors led economists to suggest the use of 
financial compensations. However, such an approach was challenged by Richard Titmus, in 
his influential work from 1970 called “The gift relationship”. In this work he established a 
dichotomy between the economic incentives for increasing blood donation rates and a 
solidarity system of altruistic unpaid donors” (Buyx, 2009 p, 329). Titmus argued that paying 
for blood donations would decrease, rather than increase the supply of blood. Over time the 
idea that such payments may be work negatively received more support among scholars – 
including some economists (Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2008). A possible outcome of the 
debate referred to above has been that most of the developed countries have abandoned 
systems with paid blood donations, and uses either fully altruistic donation systems or mixed 
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system with compensations only for incurred donor expenses (Buyx, 2009). 
Many other researchers have discussed the idea put forward by Titmus. Frey and 
OberholzerGee (1997) argued that introducing payments might reduce ones’ intrinsic 
motivation for behaving in an altruistic matter. In this way, the use of financial incentives 
could reduce blood donation rates among those already donating blood and demotivate those 
that planned to donate blood in future. Montonyo-Fernandez 1997 on the other hand, argued 
that a paid donation system is adequate since blood donation is a private good, and not a 
public good, and private goods can be supplied by markets in an effective way  
Many economic models assume that people pursuit their own material self- interest 
(consumption) and give less concern to others (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). However, income 
and consumption is only one of several motivations that may guide human behavior. The 
literature often distinguishes between intrinsic motivations and extrinsic motivations. Intrinsic 
motivations infer to incentives coming from within human being (inner feelings, moral 
obligation and self-realization), while extrinsic motivations originate from outside of the 
individual (e.g. recognition and money)(Grepperud and Pedesen, 2006).  
Theories that challenge the economic paradigm have been tested the recent decades by using 
experimental data. An important conclusion from these studies is clearly that humans are not 
only driven by a pure self-interest (Frey and Meier, 2004). People are also motivated by 
factors such as honor, respect, friendship and other social and psychological factors (Olson, 
1965). Becker (1974p, 1083), Observed, that 'apparent "charitable" behavior can also be 
motivated by a desire to shun ridiculing of others or to get social praise. Clearly pressure from 
community, feeling of guilt, compassions, or simply longing for a 'warm glow' may play vital 
roles in agents decision-making (Andreoni, 1990). 
In relation to voluntary blood donation behavior other pro-social motives than altruism have 
also been discussed.  In such models, in addition to own utility, they also consider the utility 
of other individuals as well. Bani and Strepparava (2011), Stated that blood donors sometimes 
show benevolence rather than altruism where benevolence is defined as a mixture of interest 
and altruism. Fairness motives in terms of inequality aversion may also influence behaviors  
(Frey and Meier, 2004). However, some evidence suggests that fairness considerations are 
rather unimportant. For example, “ in competitive experimental markets with complete 
contracts, in which a well-defined homogeneous good is traded, almost all subjects behaved 
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as if they were only interested in material payoffs” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 p, 818). The 
other approach is the reciprocity relationship entailing good acts are paid with good and bad 
acts are paid with bad acts (Frey and Meier, 2004). 
In the crowding theory literature, payments are believed to have two kinds of effects. The first 
effect, the direct economic effect, makes remunerated behaviors more attractive. The second 
effect, the indirect psychological effect, makes remunerated behavior less attractive. Thus, the 
psychological indirect effect works in opposition to the direct economic effect since the 
economic effect may crowd-out pro-social motives (Gneezy et al., 2011).“Providing financial 
rewards for under-taking an activity thus have an indirect negative consequence given that 
intrinsic motivation is considered to be beneficial. The indirect negative effect has been 
termed the “the hidden cost of reward” (Frey and Jegen, 2001 p, 589). 
Figure 6 put forward by (Frey and Jegen, 2001), portrays the two effects graphically. S is the 
normal supply curve that is being based upon the direct economic effect, only. If a monetary 
reward for work effort is introduced (going from a reward equal to 0 to a reward equal to R), 
we observe that work effort now increases from A to A’. The presence of the indirect 
psychological effect implies simultaneously a shift in the supply curve from S to S’ (the 
crowding-out effect). This again implies that work effort is being reduced from A’ to A’’. 
Thus introducing a reward implies that work effort is being reduced from A to A’’. In the 





Figure 6: Illustration of the crowding-out effect 
Source: (Frey and Jegen, ) 
The presence of crowding-effects in relation to blood donations has been tested by (Mellstrom 
and Johannesson, 2008). In one experiment, subjects were randomly grouped into three 
different groups. In the first group no incentives were given, in the second group individuals 
were offered SEK 50 to become blood donors, and in the third group the individuals could 
choose between receiving SEK 50 or donating SEK 50 to a particular charity organization 
(The Swedish Children's Cancer Foundation). The researchers found a decrease in the blood 
supply from 43% to 33% when payments were introduced – a finding being in line with the 
presence of a crowding effect. However, the opposite effect occurred when compared with the 
group that could give away the payment to charity. Now, blood donation rate increased from 
33% to 44%. A substantial difference between male and female was also identified. For 
males, the differences across groups were insignificant, while for females the differences were 
significant.   
In the forthcoming sections, the findings from analyzing data based upon a Norwegian survey 
will be presented. The respondents are asked whether they believe that higher payments for 
giving blood will lead to more people donating blood in Norway. Since the respondents are 
not blood donors, but is a sample of the Norwegian population, the answers to the above 
question may reveal if people in general believe in a dominating crowding-out effect or not. 
In addition, I will also investigate if the socio-demographic factors that in the literature is 
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proven to have an effect on actual blood donation behavior such as gender, age, education and 
income, also have an effect on the beliefs as to whether paying blood donors will increase the 
supply of blood donations in Norway or not. 
4.0. Method and Data  
4.1. Study Design 
 
The data of the study comes from a survey where the respondents were asked about their 
beliefs about the effects from introducing payments for blood donation. The study was 
performed in February and March of 2007. A postal questionnaire was sent to 900 randomly 
selected adults over 17 to 80 years from the 20 counties of Norway. The questionnaire 
included demographic variables such as ages, income, level of education and gender. 
Thereafter, question on peoples beliefs about paying for blood was introduced in Norwegian 
and further translated to English; Tror du at høyere betaling for å gi blod vil føre til at flere 
gir blod?  Do you believe that higher payment for giving blood will lead to more people to 
donate blood? The respondents were presented with the following three items when 
responding to the above question: Yes, No and I don’t know. In the process of collecting data, 
one reminder was sent to all selected respondents, 743 returned back the answered 
questionnaire making the response rate 83%.  
4.2.Data collection and Limitation  
The study sample has 743 respondents with few missing data in general. The variable income 
had some unanswered items, even though it is not quite big. In the process of running Chi-
Square test and the regression analysis, income could not fulfill the required assumptions. For 
that reason I decided to merge some of the income groups (from 11 items to 4 items), so that 
assumptions are fulfilled. This creates some limitations due to having wide income groups 
rather than narrow income groups. Furthermore, in process of doing cross tabulation on the 
education levels such as (elementary, primary, secondary and university) with beliefs about 
paying for blood. Some cells were found to hold less than 5 units, which is not line with chi-
square cross tabulation rules, we therefore, decided to collapse some items (elementary and 
primary) into one item called Lower level of education. More descriptions of the explanatory 




The table below describes the explanatory variables of this study including the total number 
of respondents and the corresponding percentages. 
Table 1: Describes variables in the study 
Income in (1000000) < NOK 0.299 135 18,2% 
 NOK 0.3-0.599 302 36,0% 
 NOK 0.6- 1.2 267 40,7% 
 Unswered & I don’t know (U&Ds) 38 5,1% 
Level of education  Lower level 71 9,6% 
 Secondary level 244 32,9% 
 University level 427 57,5% 
Age groups   Age group17-32 192 25,9% 
 Age group 33-48 264 35,6% 
 Age group 49-64 217 29,2% 
 Age group 65-80 69 9,3% 
Gender  Female 371 50,0% 
 Male 371 50,0% 
Valid 742 100,0% 
Missing 1  
Total 743  
 
The respondents of with a reported income between NOK 0.6 TO NOK 1.2 represent 40.7% 
of the full sample, while the income group between NOK 0.3 to NOK 0.599 presents 36%. 
Those with income below NOK 0.299 have a share equal to 18,2%. Those that did not answer 
the income question or responded “I don’t know, in the following called U&D, comprised 
only 5,1%. The percentage distribution of gender is 50% male and 50% female. The age 
group 33-48 has a percentage equal to 35,6%, followed by the age group 49-64 which is 






4.4. Statistical Analysis  
The raw data collected were coded and entered in the data entry sheet and analyzed by SPSS 
19 software. Descriptive statistics was used in order to summarize the variables. Further, 
Multinomial Logistic regression analysis is used since our dependent variable (hereafter 
denoted as (“beliefs”) has three nominal categorical outcomes (1=Yes; 2=No, and, 3= “I 
don’t know”). A Logistic regression was chosen since it is adequate for testing relationships 
between categorical dependent variables and independent variables. Specially, A Multinomial 
Logistic regression was chosen for two purposes. First, because a Multinomial Logistic 
regression model represents an effective and reliable way of obtaining an estimated 
probability of belonging to a specified population (e.g.“beliefs”) in terms of odd ratios (Ying 
Joanne Peng, 2003). Second, because a Multinomial Logistic regression model is a method 
that estimates net effects of a group of independent variable on the outcome variable (Ying 
Joanne Peng, 2003). A Multinomial Logistic regression uses maximum likelihood predictions 
to evaluate the probability of categorical memberships. 
In analyzing the data of this study, we employed the following three methods to answer our 
two research questions:  
(i) A Pearson Chi-Square test is applied to study whether “beliefs” differ in a significant way? 
(ii) Cross tabulations using Pearson Chi-Square tests are used to test the possible effects from 
gender, income, education level and age on people’s beliefs.   
(iii) Univariate and Multivariate Multinomial Logistic regressions are applied to estimate odd 
ratios for three different models of the study; Model A (“Yes” versus “I don’t know”), Model 
B ((“No” versus “I don’t know”), and Model C (“Yes” versus “No”).  
4.5. Multinomial Regression Model 
A Multinomial Logistic regression model is a generalization of the standard Logistic model 
(binary response) that fits multiple category responses (Starkweather and Moske, 2011). At 
each combination of levels of the independent variables, the model assumes that the 
categories of the outcome variables have a Multinomial distribution. The Multinomial 
Logistic model can be applied to any number of categories, but more understandable results 
can be extracted from the model when the outcome variable has only three categories. Since 
the dependent variable in our study have three outcome (categorical variables) that cannot be 
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ranked in a meaningful way, a Multinomial regression model is appropriate. The response 
variable of the analysis is “beliefs” (Y), which can be presented as follows:  
The r                        
                           
                             
               
  
Since the response variable may attain three categories we need two Logit models. There are 
k =4 explanatory variables (x1, x2, x3,…xk) in our model, being denoted as follows; 
 
                                                  X1 is “Gender” 
                                                  X2 is “Age” 
                                                  X3 is “Level of education” 
                                                  X4 is “Income (house3hold income)” 
  
The Logit models for nominal responses pair each response category to a reference category 
where the choice of the reference category is arbitrary. For this study, the reference category 
chosen is the last category of the response variable being coded as 3 (“I don’t know”). Given 
this assumption the three relevant models for this study are as follows: 
 
Model A. “Yes” versus “I don’t know” 
   
               
                   
                                  
 Model B. “No” versus “I don’t know” 
      
             
                  
                                  
  Model C. “Yes” versus “No” 
   
               
             
     
                                    
                                   
  
    
               
                   
     
              





4.6. Statistical Assumptions and Dealing with Outliers   
Multinomial Logistic regression analysis does not assume normality, linearity, or 
homoscedasticity, but assumes independence among the dependent categorical variables 
(Starkweather and Moske, 2011). This means that the choice of one category is not influenced 
by the choice of the other category. Cases of multicolinearity and outliers have to be checked 
because they may bias the findings. After checking for multicolinearity in the independent 
variables, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was found to be equal to one for all independent 
variables, suggesting no multicolinearity between the independent variables. Interaction was 
checked with SPSS for the selected explanatory variables (gender, income and age), and no 
changes in significances were found in single variable and the products of interacting 
variables.  
SPSS does not compute any diagnostic tests for outliers in a Multinomial Logistic regression 
analysis (Homser, 2000). For this reason Logistic regression procedures are used to calculate 
diagnostic measures. In order to do so, the group that responded, “Yes” is compared with the 
group that responded, “I don’t know”. Furthermore, the group that responded “No” is 
compared with the group that responded, “I don’t know”. Afterwards two binary logistic 
regressions was run using case selection to compare group 1 (Yes) and 2 (No) with group 3 (I 
don-t know)). From the two analyses, we will look for studentized residuals larger than ± 
2.0%, and start testing multinomial solution without these cases. If the accuracy rate of this 











Below the relationships between the independent variables (Age, Income, Education level and 
Gender) and the dependent variable (beliefs) are examined. 
Table 2: Classification of accuracy with outliers 
 
Observed Predicted 
Yes No I don’t know Percent Correct Predictions 
(PCP) 
Yes 244 135 0 64,4% 
No 131 172 0 56,8% 
I don’t know 34 27 0 0,0% 
Overall 
Percentages 
55,0% 45,0% 0,0% 56,0% 
It follows from table 2, when all the cases that are regarded as outliers are included the overall 
accuracy rate (PCP) equals 56%. In table 3, the same results are presented, for the case where 
outliers are disregarded.  
Table 3: classification of accuracy without outliers 
Observed Predicted 
Yes No Idon’t know Percent Correct Predictions 
(PCP) 
Yes 244 135 0 64,4% 
No 131 172 0 56,8% 




55,9% 44,1% 0,0% 57,0% 
From table 3, we observe that after removing the outliers  (12 outliers for “ I don’t know” in 
table 3?), the overall accuracy rate (PCP) has improved from 56% (table 2) to 57% (table 3).  
The overall accuracy has improved with 1%, which is less than 2%, thus the model that 
includes all outliers will be used in analyzing our data. 
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5.0. Results  
In this chapter the results from three different types of analyses are to be presented. Section 
5.1. Presents the results from the Chi-Square tests, section 5.2 present the results from the 
univariate regression models, while section 5.3 presents the results from the multivariate 
regression analyses. However, before doing this I will present the results for the responses of 
the “beliefs”- question presented in section 4.1 (page 15). 
Of the 742 respondents, 378 (50.9%) responded, “Yes”, 309 responded “No” (40.8%), and 61 
(8.2%) responded, “I don’t know”.  Of those that that had made up their opinion (683), 55.6 
% answered “Yes” while 44,4% responded “No”(see table 4), meaning that the two groups do 
vary in size but not much. In order to find out whether there is a significant difference 
between the two groups that had made up their mind, a Pearson Chi-Square test was 
performed for the case where “I don’t know” respondents were excluded, however, it is 
included for the subsequent regression analysis). The results from the Pearson Chi-Square test 
are presented in table 4 and we observe that the Chi-Square Statistics is 8,469
a
 with a p-value 
equal to 004. Thus, there is a significant difference between those that had made up their 
opinion. More people believe that a higher payment for giving blood will lead to more people 
to donate blood than the opposite belief.  
Table 4: The distribution across “Yes” and “No” for the “belief” variable (frequencies and percentages). Chi-Square 
test statistics 
5.1. The Role of the Socio-demographic Variables 
In the following tables the distribution of responses (“beliefs”) in relation to the each of the 
four following socio-demographic variables will be studied: Gender, Income, Age and 
Education will be studied using cross tabulations and Pearson Chi-Square test for all the 
variables.  







Chi-Square                                                                               8,469
a
 
Df                                                                                       1 
Asymp. Sig.                                                                                    ,004 




5.1.1. Beliefs and Gender  
Table 5 below shows how beliefs are distributed conditional on gender. We observe from this 
table that out of 743 respondents, 372 are females and 371 are males. Furthermore, we 
observe that the percentages across gender do not vary much for the three categories.  The 
Pearson Chi-Square test gives a test statistics equal 0,675 (2 degrees of freedom) and a P-
value equal to 0,714. These findings confirm that gender is not, in a significant way, 
associated with “beliefs”.  
 
 Table 5: The distribution of responses (beliefs and gender). Frequencies, percentages and Pearson Chi-Square 
Statistics. 
BELIEFS Gender Total 
Female Male 
Yes  186 193 379 
 50,0% 52,0% 51,0% 
No  157 146 303 
 42,2% 39,4% 40,8% 
I don’t know  29 32 61 
 7,8% 8,6% 8,2% 
Total  372 371 743 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)     P-value 
Pearson Chi-Square ,675
a
 2 ,714 
a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 30,46. 
 
5.1.2. Beliefs and Age Groups  
Table 6 below shows how the “beliefs” are distributed conditional on age groups. We observe 
from this table that out of 743 respondents, 192 belong to age group 17-32, 265 belong to age 
group 33-48, and 217 belong to age group 49-64 while 69 belong to age group 65-80. 
Furthermore, we observe that the percentages across age groups vary much for the three 
categories. Age group 17-32 has highest percentage responding “Yes” followed by age group 
33-48. However, age group 17-32 has the lowest percentage response in terms of  “No” 
whereas age group 49-64 has the highest percentage responding “No”. The Pearson Chi-
Square test gives a test statistics equal 61,690 (6 degrees of freedom) and a P-value equal to 




Table 6: The distribution of responses (beliefs and age). Frequencies, percentages and Pearson Chi-Square Statistics. 
  BELIEFS                  
  Age groups in years (yrs.) Total 
17-32 yrs 33-48 yrs 49-64 yrs 65-80 yrs 
Yes  137 128 85 29 379 
 71,4% 48,3% 39,2% 42,0% 51,0% 
No  46 114 117 26 303 
 24,0% 43,0% 53,9% 37,7% 40,8% 
I dont know  9 23 15 14 61 
 4,7% 8,7% 6,9% 20,3% 8,2% 
Total  192 265 217 69 743 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 61,690 6 ,000 
a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5,66. 
5.1.3. Beliefs and Income  
Table7 below shows how beliefs are distributed conditional on income. We observe from this 
table that, of 743 respondents, 268 belong to income group NOK 0.6 to NOK 1.2, 302 belong 
to income group NOK 0.3 to NOK 0.599, 135 belong to income group <NOK 0.299 while 38 
belong to U&Ds. Furthermore, we observe that the percentages across income groups vary 
much across the three categories. Respondents with income less than NOK 299000 have the 
highest percentage that responded, “Yes”. There are no much variations in response category 
for income NOK 0.6 to NOK 1.2and NOK 0.3 to NOK 0.599. The Pearson Chi-Square test 
gives a test statistics equal 16,004 (6 degrees of freedom) and a P-value equal to 0,014. These 







Table 7: The distribution of responses (beliefs and income). Frequencies, percentages and Pearson Chi-Square 
Statistics. 
BELIEFS Income in Norwegian Kroner (NOK 1000000) Total 




  <0.299 
Yes  25 128 144 82 379 
 65,8% 47,8% 47,7% 60,7% 51,0% 
No  11 124 127 41 303 
 28,9% 46,3% 42,1% 30,4% 40,8% 
I dont know  2 16 31 12 61 
 5,3% 6,0% 10,3% 8,9% 8,2% 
Total  38 268 302 135 743 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Chi-Square Test 16,004 6 ,014 
 
 
5.1.4. Beliefs and Education Level  
Table 8 below shows how beliefs are distributed conditional on Level of education. We 
observe from this table that, of 742 respondents, 71 have a Lower level of education, 244 have 
a Middle level education while 427 have a higher level of education. Furthermore, we observe 
that the percentages across Level of education do not vary much for the three categories.  The 
Pearson Chi-Square test gives a test statistics equal 2,538
 
(5 degrees of freedom) and a P-
value equal to 0,638. These findings confirm that education is not, in a significant way, 







Table 8: The distribution of responses (beliefs and education level). Frequencies, percentages and Pearson Chi-Square 
Statistics. 





level of   
education 
Higher 
level of        
education 
  Yes  32 133 213 378 
 45,1% 54,5% 49,9% 50,0% 
No  33 93 177 303 
 46,5% 38,1% 41,5% 40,8% 
I don’t do know 
 
 6 18 37 61 
 8,5% 7,4% 8,7% 8,2% 
Total  71 244 427 742 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2,538
a
 4 , 638 
a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5,84. 
 
5.2. Univariate Analysis  
Univariate Multinomial Logistic regression analysis was used to analyze the effects of 
univariate variables such as gender; income, age and education on the “beliefs” about paying 
for blood will lead to more people to donate blood. The results of the regression are shown in 
tables 9 to 12. 
5.2.1. Univariate effect of Gender  
The results from estimating the three models (A, B and C) are presented in table 9.  In all 
models, the coefficients (B) and the odds-ratio are estimated. The reference category for the 
explanatory variable (gender) is male in all three models. We observe that the coefficient for 
gender is negative and insignificant for Model A and B and the odds-ratios are 0,94 (model A) 
and 0,843 (model B).  For Model C, however, the same coefficient is positive (0,110), but still 
insignificant. The odds-ratio for Model C is 1,116 saying that females are 1.116 times more 




Table 9: Univariate analysis of beliefs yes, no and I don’t know with gender 
Beliefs 
 
B P value Odd 
ratio 
95% Confidence 





Model A Intercept 1,858 ,000    
Gender -,061 ,824 ,940 ,547 1,616 
Model B Intercept 1,689 ,000    
Gender -,171 ,543 ,843 ,486 1,462 
Model C Intercept , 170 , 118    
Gender ,110  ,477      1,116 ,825 1,510 
 
a. Model A & B the reference category is. I don’t know; Model C the reference category is. No; b. Male as a reference  
5.2.2. Univariate Effect of Income 
The results from estimating the three models (A, B and C) are presented in table 10.  In all 
models, the coefficients (B) and the odds-ratio are estimated. The reference category for the 
explanatory variable (income) is <NOK 0.299 in all three models. We observe that the 
coefficients for all income groups in model A are positive except for income group NOK 0.3 
to NOK 0.599), and are all insignificant. The odds-ratio for model A indicate that U&Ds and 
those with income between NOK 0.6 to NOK1.2 are 1,829 and 1,171 more likely to say “yes” 
than I don’t know, whereas those with income NOK 0.3 to NOK 0.599 are 0,680 less likely to 
say “yes” than i don’t know. 
For Model B, all the coefficients (B) are positive, the odds-ratio for those respondents who 
unanswered and don’t know (U&Ds) their income are 1,610 more likely to say “No” than “I 
don’t know”. In the same model, those with income between NOK 0.6 to NOK 1.2 are 2,268 
times more likely to say “No” than “I don’t know” and this coefficient is  almost significant at 
a 5%-level (p- value 0,052), whereas those with income NOK 0.3 to NOK 0,599 are 1,199 
more likely to say “No” as opposed to “I don’t know”.   
For model C, only of the coefficients (B) of income U&Ds is positive but it is insignificant. 
However, for the income groups NOK 0.6 to NOK 1.2 and NOK 0.3 to NOK 0,599 the 
coefficients (B) are negative and are significant. The odd ratios of the respondents with 
income NOK 0.6 to NOK 1.2 and NOK 0.3 to NOK 0.599 indicates that the respondents are 
0,516 and 0,567 less likely to respond “Yes” than “No”. 
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Table 10: Univariate analysis of beliefs Yes, no and I don’t know with income (NOK Million) 
Beliefs 
 
Income B P-value. Odd 
ratio 
95% Confidence 










Intercept 1,922 ,000    
U&Ds ,604 ,449 1,829 ,383 8,727 
0.6 to 1,2 ,158 ,699 1,171 ,527 2,601 
0.3-0.599 -,386 ,293 ,680 ,331 1,396 
< 0.299 0
b
  1,0   




Intercept 1,229 ,000    
U&Ds ,476 ,569 1,610 ,313 8,284 
0.6 to 1.2 ,819 ,052 2,268 ,991 5,189 
0.3-0.599 ,182 ,637 1,199 ,564 2,548 
< 0.299 0
b
  1,0   




Intercept ,693 ,000    
U&Ds ,128 ,755 1,136 ,510 2,534 
0.6 to 1.2 -,661 ,004 ,516 ,329 ,809 
0.3-0.599 -,568 ,012 ,567 ,364 ,884 
< 0.299 0
b
  1,0   
      











5.2.3. Univariate effect of Age Groups  
The estimated results for three models (A, B and C) are presented in table11.  In all models, 
the coefficients (B) and odds-ratios are estimated. The reference category for the explanatory 
variable (age) is age group 65-80 years in all three models. We observe that the coefficients 
for all age groups are positive except for one group in model C. Furthermore, all age groups in 
model A and B are significant while only one age group in Model C is significant.  
The odd ratio for age group 17-32 years in Model A is 7,349, saying that this age group are 
7,349 times more likely to say “Yes than “I don’t know”. In the same model the odd ratio for 
age groups 33-48 and 49-64 are 2,687 and 2,736, saying that these two age groups are 2,687 
and 2,736 times more likely to say “Yes” as opposed to “I don’t know”. 
For model B, the odd ratio for age groups 17-32 years and 33-48 are 2,752 and 2,669, saying 
that these age groups are 2,752 and 2,669 more likely to say “Yes” as opposed to “ I don’t 
know”. However, the odd ratio for age group 49-64 is 4,2, saying that this age group is 4,2 
more likely to say “Yes” than “I don’t know”.   
For model C, the odd ratios of age groups 17-32 and 33-48 are 2,670 and 1,007, this is to say 
that these groups are 2,670 and 1,007 more likely to say “Yes” than “No”. However, the odd 
ratio of age group 49-64 are 0,651, and for that regards they are less likely to say “Yes” as 


















Table 11: Univariate analysis of beliefs yes, no and I don’t know with age groups 
Beliefs Age           B    P-value Odd 
ratio 
95% Confidence 










Intercept ,728 ,025    
17-32 1,995 ,000 7,349 2,904 18,593 
33-48 ,988 ,013 2,687 1,235 5,844 
49-64 1,006 ,019 2,736 1,179 6,346 
65-80 0
b
   1,0   




Intercept ,619 ,062    
17-32 1,012 ,040 2,752 1,048 7,228 
33-48 ,982 ,015 2,669 1,212 5,876 
49-64 1,435 ,001 4,200 1,807 9,760 
65-80 0
b
  1,0   
      
 
Model C 
Intercept ,109 ,686    
17-32 ,982 ,002 2,670 1,428 4,993 
33-48 ,007 ,982 1,007 ,560 1,810 
49-64 -,429 ,160 ,651 ,358 1,185 
65-80 0
b
  1,0   
 
a. Model A & B the reference category is. I don’t know; Model C the reference category is no 








5.2.4. Univariate effect of Education Levels  
The results from estimating the three models (A, B and C) are presented in table12.  In all 
models, the coefficients (B) and the odds-ratio are estimated. The reference category for the 
explanatory variable (education) is higher level of education in all three models. We observe 
that the coefficients (B) are negative for Lower level of education for both model A and C, 
but positive for model B. The coefficients (B) for Middle level of education are all positive.   







B P-value Odd 
ratio 
95% Confidence 





       
Model A Intercept 1,750 ,000    
Lower level  -,076 ,873 ,926 ,362 2,370 
Middle level ,250 ,418 1,24 ,702 2,347 
Higher level 0
b
 . . . . 
      
Intercept 1,565 ,000    
Model B  Lower level ,140 ,771 1,10 ,449 2,941 
Middle level ,077 ,807 1,00 ,583 2,001 
Higher level 0
b
 . . . . 
      
Model C Intercept ,185 ,069    
Lower -,216 ,421 ,806 ,476 1,363 
Middle ,173 ,308 1,188 ,853 1,656 
Higher 0
b
 . . . . 
Higher 0
b
 . . . . 
 
a. Model A & B the reference category is. I don’t know; Model C the reference category is no 
 b. The reference  Higher education level 
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5.3. Multivariate Analysis   
In this section we present the results from undertaking Multivariate Multinomial Logistic 
regression analyses meaning that all four explanatory variables now enter simultaneously into 
each regression. Table 13, below, sums up the most important findings from the three models 
(Model A, B and C). Each of the three models will be commented upon in more detail below. 
In doing this, I will only focus on variables that are found to be significant. For the 
explanatory variables the chosen reference categories are male (Gender), 65-80 yrs. (Age 
groups), less than NOK 299000 (Income) and High (Education level). 
Model A compares respondents answering, “Yes” with those that responded, “I don’t know”. 
We observe from table 13 that the only explanatory variable that is significant is Age. All 
three age groups are now significant at a 5%-level. Compared with age group 65-80 yrs., the 
age group 17-32 is 6,842 times more likely to answer, “Yes” than to answer “I don’t know”. 
The age groups 33-48 yrs and 49-64 yrs are 2,35 and 2,37 times more likely to respond “Yes” 
as opposed to “I don’t know” relative to age group 65-80 yrs.  
Model B compares respondents answering “No” with those that responded, “I don’t know”. 
We now observe that Age is the only explanatory variable that is significant and all three age 
groups are still significant at a 5%-level. Compared with age group 65-80 yrs., the age group 
17-32 yrs. is 2,687 times more likely to answer “No” than to answer “I don’t know”. The age 
groups 33-48 yrs and 49-64 yrs. are 2,28 and 3.58 times more likely to respond “No” as 
opposed to “I don’t know” relative to age group 65-80 yrs.  
Model C compares respondents answering “Yes” with those answering “No”. Now we 
observe that one of the age groups (17-32 yrs) as well as gender become significant. Members 
of the age group 17-32 yrs are 2,54 times more likely to say “Yes” as opposed to “No” if 
compared with the reference age group. Furthermore, females are 0,72 times less likely to say, 







Table 13: Multinomial logistic regression analysis (Model A, B and C). Odds-ratio and P-values. 
Characteristics      
of the variables 
Model (A) 
Yes Versus I don’t 
know 
Model (B) 
No versus I don’t 
know 
Model(C) 
Yes Versus no 
 Odd ratio P-value      Odd ratio P-value Odd ratio P-value 
Gender       
Female 













Income (NOK)        









1,491 ,364 2,228 ,077 0,669 
 
,108 
0.3-0.599 0,883 ,748 1,293 ,522 0,683 
 
,112 
<0.299  1,0 . 1,0 . 1,0 . 
       
Age groups       
17-32 yrs 6,842 ,000 2,687 ,050 2,546 
 
,004 
33-48 yrs 2,35 ,035 2,288 ,045 1,027 
 
,930 
49-64 yrs 2,37 ,049 3,584 ,004 0,661 
 
,184 
65-80 yrs 1,0 . 1,0 . 1,0 . 
       
Education levels       
Lower 1,234 ,673 1,387 ,512 0,189 
 
,681 
Middle 1,311 ,395 1,119 ,576 1,094 
 
,615 





6.0. Discussion  
To ensure an adequate supply of blood, the use of economic incentives have been proposed 
(Kasraian and Maghsudlu, 2012). However, economic incentives need not be effective in 
achieving adequate supply of blood as often stated in the literature (Chmielewski et al., 2012). 
Given this, it is interesting to know what people in general believe about the effects from 
improved economic incentives and what factors that affect such beliefs.  
In this paper, studying the general “beliefs” of the Norwegian population, we found that there 
is a significant difference between the number who believe that paying for blood will lead 
more people to donate blood than the number that believe the opposite.  This finding may 
suggest that a majority of Norwegians do not believe that the crowding-out effects dominated 
the price effect when it comes to blood donation. However, the findings from this study do 
not say that if higher payments for blood donation is introduced, that the number of donors 
will increase. The reason for this is that the respondents do not say whether or not themselves 
will donate more blood in response to improved economic incentives.  
In analyzing the factors that affect people’s “beliefs” about blood donation behavior, we 
found that gender is insignificant both for the Pearson Chi Square test and the Univariate 
Multinomial Logistic regression model, but it became significant for the Multivariate 
Multinomial Logistic regression model. Income is significant for the Pearson Chi Square test, 
but show slight significance NOK 0.6 to NOK 1.2 in model B and significance in  both 
income NOK 0.3 to NOK 0.599 and NOK 0.6 to NOK 1.2  in model C for the Univariate, But 
insignificant for Multivariate Multinomial Logistic regressions. Age became significant for all 
three methodologies with the exception of age groups 33-48 and 49-64 Years in model C, 



















Gender - - Significant (model C) 
Income Significant Significant for model 
C 
- 
Age groups Significant Significant for model 
A and B. Model C for 
one age group  
Significant for model A and B. 
Model C for one age group (17 -
32 years) 
Education level     - - - 
 
All income categories are found insignificant except income NOK 0.3 to NOK 0.599 and 
NOK 0.6 to NOK 1.2 in Model C in table 10a. From this study we found that people with 
high income will not donate blood in exchange of payment. This is in line with earlier studies 
that introducing income reward in blood donation, crowding out effects (figure 6) occurs 
(Frey and Jorgen, 2001.  
 Examining gender differences in the motivation individuals so that more volunteers for blood 
donation, we found that women are less motivated by payment than men. However, we are 
cautious about this finding, because female has been insignificant in univariate and suddenly 
it changed to be significant in Multivariate. The cause of this change can be due to unbalanced 
sample size and extremely group variation, relative to between group variations, that have 
been put forward by (Yi Xue Za Zhi, 1995) which I found in the sample study. However, a 
study done Chmielewski et al. (2012) found that payment crowded-out intrinsic motivations 
of females and hence few volunteered for paid blood donation.  
Age groups are found to play a significant role in an effort to increase blood donation. From 
this study we found that people of younger ages beliefs paying for blood increases the 
recruitment of blood donors. Moreover in a comparative study between unpaid and paid blood 
donation found out that paid blood donor are significantly males of younger age (Condie and 
Maxwell, 1970). The respondents of age group 17-32 beliefs payment increases blood 
donation and for that regards their intrinsic motivations are replaced by extrinsic motivations 




In respect to respondents level of education we found that no significant multivariate 
difference between the low levels of education and middle level of education. However, most 
respondents with lower level of education share the beliefs that payments will not lead to 
more blood donors, but in a study done Chmielewski et al. (2012) found those with low level 
of education were found to be interested in receiving incentives. 
  
The study is a representative of the Norwegian population with high response rate. But, it has 
to be interpreted with reservation due to some limitations found. From the  results we found 
some differences of chi-square analysis, univariate and multivariate Multinomial Logistic 
regression. For instance variable gender that are found insignificant in the cross tabulation 
frequency and in univariate are found to be significant multivariate multinomial logistic 
regression. Also in the process of dealing with interactions some of the categories of 
independent variables are combined. This makes the width intervals of categories large; hence 
information that could be available in smaller intervals may not be available in larger width 
intervals. The confidence intervals (CI) of some variables are found to be wide, which can be 
a weakness that can bias the findings of the study. Finally, one of the response outcome 
variable has too few respondents as compared to other two outcome variables. For that 











7.0. Conclusion  
Earlier studies have hypothesized that paying blood donors might undermine people’s intrinsic 
motivations and in this way discourages people from donating blood . One example is Richard Timus 
(1970) who put forward the hypothesis that blood donation will be reduced when payment is 
introduced. In this paper we studied peoples beliefs about the effects from using economic incentives 
in connection with blood donation.  
The two main findings from this study are: (i) that the majority of the Norwegian population 
above 17 years believe that payments will lead more people to donate blood. However, the 
difference between those that believe and those that do not believe is not very large (55% and 
45% of those that have made up their mind), (ii), that Norwegians younger than 50 years, 
more than older people, believe that economic incentives will increase the number of blood 
donors. In addition, there is some evidence that females, to a lesser extent than males, believe 
in such an effect.  
The scope of this research is confined to general beliefs yes, no and I don’t know for paying 
blood and in addition word “payment” which was used has been too general. Future research 
that uses both qualitative and quantitative data with broader perspectives on beliefs and 
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9.0. Appendix  
15a: Table showing multivariate multinomial Logistic regression analysis with three outcome variables and 
independent variables.(tables 15a and 15b are combined in to one as shown in table 13 in page 32)  
Do you belief higher payment for blood 




B Sig. Exp(B) 95% Confidence 






Intercept ,676 ,172    
No answer & dont know 
(U&Ds) 
,391 ,630 1,479 ,301 7,264 
0.6-1.2 ,399 ,364 1,491 ,629 3,533 
0.3-0.599 -,125 ,748 ,883 ,413 1,888 
<0. 299 0
b
 . . . . 
Lower level ,210 ,673 1,234 ,465 3,277 
Middle level ,271 ,395 1,311 ,702 2,450 
Higher level 0
b
 . . . . 
Age group17-32 yrs 1,923 ,000 6,842 2,642 17,721 
Age group 33-48 yrs ,854 ,035 2,350 1,060 5,208 
Age group 49-64 yrs ,863 ,049 2,371 1,004 5,598 
Age group 65-80 yrs 0
b
 . . . . 
Female -,083 ,775 ,921 ,523 1,623 
Male 0
b
 . . . . 
no 
Intercept ,124 ,809    
No answer & dont know 
(U&Ds) 
,276 ,744 1,318 ,252 6,909 
0.6-1.2 ,801 ,077 2,228 ,918 5,407 
0.3-0.599 ,257 ,522 1,293 ,588 2,844 
<0. 299 0
b
 . . . . 
Lower level ,327 ,512 1,387 ,522 3,680 
Middle level ,181 ,576 1,199 ,635 2,264 
Higher level 0
b
 . . . . 
Age group17-32 yrs ,988 ,050 2,687 ,998 7,232 
Age group 33-48 yrs ,827 ,045 2,288 1,018 5,139 
Age group 49-64 yrs 1,277 ,004 3,584 1,515 8,480 
Age group 65-80 yrs 0
b
 . . . . 
Female ,245 ,401 1,278 ,721 2,267 
Male 0
b
 . . . . 
a. The reference category is: I don’t know. 







15b: Table showing multivariate multinomial Logistic regression analysis with three outcome variables. 
Do you belief higher payment for blood 
donation will cause many people to donate?
 
 








Intercept ,552 ,118    
No answer & don’t 
know(U&Ds) 
,115 ,788 1,122 ,485 2,597 
0.6-1.2million -,402 ,108 ,669 ,410 1,093 
0.3-0.599 -,382 ,112 ,683 ,426 1,094 
< 0.299 0
b
 . . . . 
Lower level -,117 ,681 ,890 ,511 1,551 
Middle level ,090 ,615 1,094 ,771 1,551 
Higher level 0
b
 . . . . 
Age group17-32 yrs ,935 ,004 2,546 1,344 4,823 
Age group 33-48 yrs ,027 ,930 1,027 ,564 1,869 
Age group 49-64 yrs -,413 ,184 ,661 ,359 1,218 
Age group 65-80 yrs 0
b
 . . . . 
Female -,328 ,046 ,720 ,522 ,995 
Male 0
b
 . . . . 
i dont know 
Intercept -,124 ,809    
No answer & don’t 
know (U&Ds) 
-,276 ,744 ,759 ,145 3,975 
0.6-1.2 -,801 ,077 ,449 ,185 1,089 
0.3-0.599 -,257 ,522 ,773 ,352 1,700 
<0. 299 0
b
 . . . . 
Lower level -,327 ,512 ,721 ,272 1,914 
Middle level -,181 ,576 ,834 ,442 1,575 
Higher level 0
b
 . . . . 
Age group17-32 yrs -,988 ,050 ,372 ,138 1,002 
Age group 33-48 yrs -,827 ,045 ,437 ,195 ,982 
Age group 49-64 yrs -1,277 ,004 ,279 ,118 ,660 
Age group 65-80 yrs 0
b
 . . . . 
Female -,245 ,401 ,782 ,441 1,388 
Male 0
b
 . . . . 
a. The reference category is: no. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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